<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>CVE-2023-28252 on WE ARE THE BUG</title><link>https://wearethebug.dev/tags/cve-2023-28252/</link><description>Recent content on WE ARE THE BUG</description><generator>Tradecraft</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 02 Jul 2022 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://wearethebug.dev/tags/cve-2023-28252/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>VULNLAB: Bruno</title><link>https://wearethebug.dev/posts/vl-bruno/</link><pubDate>Sat, 02 Jul 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://wearethebug.dev/posts/vl-bruno/</guid><description>Bruno is a medium-rated Windows domain box that chains insecure application configuration and weak Active Directory hygiene to go from no access to domain admin. The service-facing component is a custom .NET application that extracts ZIP entries unsafely using Path.Combine, allowing crafted archives to perform a zip-slip and place files under the app folder. That capability enables a DLL-search-path hijack - an attacker who can write to the queue share can drop a malicious dll and achieve code execution as the service user. On the network/AD side, an account svc_scan is discoverable and kerberoastable/AS-REP crackable; its recovered credentials grant write access to the queue share, which is used to trigger the DLL payload and get a low-privilege shell. From there the default machine account quota of authenticated users and RBCD are abused to perform a Kerberos relay/RBCD attack that resets the Administrator password and yields full domain compromise.</description></item></channel></rss>