<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>GenericAll on WE ARE THE BUG</title><link>https://wearethebug.dev/tags/genericall/</link><description>Recent content on WE ARE THE BUG</description><generator>Tradecraft</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2024 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://wearethebug.dev/tags/genericall/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>VULNLAB: Sendai</title><link>https://wearethebug.dev/posts/vl-sendai/</link><pubDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://wearethebug.dev/posts/vl-sendai/</guid><description>Sendai is a medium-difficulty Windows Active Directory machine focused on weak account hygiene, GMSA abuse, and ADCS misconfigurations. Initial access is gained through anonymous SMB enumeration, revealing files that hint at expired accounts with weak passwords. RID brute-forcing identifies users, and login attempts highlight accounts in a forced password reset state. By resetting thomas.powell’s password, the attacker obtains a domain foothold. BloodHound analysis shows that Powell’s group membership can be leveraged to compromise the MGTSVC$ GMSA account, enabling remote code execution on the domain controller. Further local enumeration uncovers inline credentials for clifford.davey, whose CA-OPERATORS group membership grants GenericAll rights over a certificate template. Abusing ESC4/ESC1 conditions with Certipy, the attacker forges a certificate for the administrator account, retrieves its NT hash, and authenticates via WinRM, achieving full domain compromise.</description></item></channel></rss>